|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
![]() |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||
Summary
The most direct argument for the existence of God is that which claims actual experience of God. Such an argument is the oldest form of religious justification but is also arguably the most controversial. Whereas the other arguments rely on some form of logical persuasion, the religious experience argument relies totally on the authenticity of such an experience.
From the point of view of the potential convert there is no need that the experience be a direct personal one. Trust or faith in the genuine experience of another may also act as proof of a divine being. However, criticisms of the argument are primarily concerned with the possibility of such an experience, and secondarily with how it might be possible to authenticate another's testimony.
We will return to the problems associated with religious
experience later on in more depth.
History
The problem of verifying religious experience is an old one. St. Theresa of Avilea was accused of being in league with evil spirits, but argued that her vision was of divine origin. Jesus himself was accused of the same thing because he was able to cast out demons.
It seems that the notion of origin - where these experiences come from - is all important when we consider whether such an experience is proof or not of God's existence.
Descartes highlighted many of the problems when he showed just how uncertain most of our everyday perceptions were - let alone those of supposed divine origin. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) similarly asked how it was possible to know whether God spoke to you in a dream, or whether you simply dreamed that God spoke to you.
A further issue was raised by A. J. Ayer (1910-89) when he pointed out that mystical experiences are usually only descriptive of the inner experience of the person who has them - not of the objective existence of the being who is said to produce them (i.e. God).
From a sympathetic viewpoint, William James (1842-1910) argued that mystical experiences cannot simply be discounted - no more than everyday ones can be. For instance, if we say that St. Paul was an epileptic, and try and account for his visions in that way, we also have to explain how certain acceptable everyday states of mind may also resemble types of mental illness - think of being in love!
Questions
1. One of the criticisms of this argument is that the notion
of God is an impossible one anyway. Is this conclusive?
2. We have all had experience of being deceived by things - through simple
mistake, hallucination through illness, etc. Could religious experiences therefore
be an example of this?
3. Both psychology and sociology provide persuasive reasons for rejecting
the authenticity of religious experiences. Is it therefore better to accept
alternative explanations because they are more probable?
4. It is possible for two people to view the same experience in very different
ways and yet for both of those experiences to be valid (think of seeing a
film, or listening to music). Could religious experience be explained as simply
a matter of seeing the wonder of the world?
5. Would the above view of religious experience avoid the problems of authenticity?
What would then differentiate it from drug-related experiences, or euphoria
arising from tiredness or illness?