Ontological Claims as Epistemological Constraints

[skeptic23]

I'm working on a hypothesis, which is that certain ontological claims primarily serve epistemological purposes rather than being ontologically informative. All ontological claims serve to constrain epistemology somewhat, but some ontological claims seem to offer little more than epistemological constraint.

Key to my hypothesis is a trend that I have observed for a long time in ontological discussions: ignoring or dismissing the role of ignorance in our knowledge. Metaphorically, what little we each know is like a small rock in a sea of ignorance where undiscovered information swims like so many fish. From our little rocks of knowledge we often throw nets into the water around us, nets beyond which we claim that good fish (valid information) cannot be found. We don't just claim that outside our nets there are no fish worth catching, but that the “fish” that we think we "see" out there are not what they appear to be. In fact, they really are not there at all.

Nets are used to collect things, but this use of our metaphorical nets is to provide a demarcation, a barrier. I have begun to wonder if we throw those nets out to keep ourselves collected preventing us from looking to see whether there really are good fish beyond the nets. Maybe we don't truly believe that there are no fish out there beyond our net barriers. Maybe we actually suspect that they are out there.

Physicalism is a good example. A physicalist draws a line that puts everything he deems to be "physical" within the domain of existence, and which excludes everything from the domain of existence that he deems to be "not physical." That draws an ontological line between what does and doesn't exist, a line that is drawn well beyond the limit of the physicalist's available knowledge and evidence.

The physicalist draws this line drawn prior to examination of evidence that might support or falsify the claim that only "physical" things exist. This predisposes the physicalist to be skeptical of anything "not physical," putting the burden of proof on claims that entail phenomena deemed to be "not physical." However, the physicalist did not impose a similar burden of proof on his own claim that only "physical" things exist. Physicalists regard "not physical" phenomena to be non-existent or imaginary not by virtue of evidential proof, but because they exclude those phenomena from the domain of existence by definition. This constitutes a bias.

I have little interest in criticizing this bias. My interest is to understand why this bias is so attractive and so common.

The physicalist claim does not inform ontological understanding, but rather constrains the domain of valid ontological claims. Not only does it do this largely without evidential support, it serves to restrict the domain of valid evidence that could inform ontological inquiry. Evidence that might challenge or extend the definition of "physical" is disadvantaged because it entails phenomena deemed to be "not physical." Epistemological approaches not rooted in physical observation are considered suspect. This serves to invalidate evidence by designation rather than by observation and investigation. This in turn strengthens the physicalist's bias by skewing his extant body of "valid" evidence through selective inclusion of evidence that reinforces the physicalist claim and selective omission of evidence that might challenge that claim or open it to question. The support that this "validated" body of evidence affords the physicalist claim is somewhat circular, since the criteria for inclusion in it are influenced by the pre-evidential constraint imposed on them by the very claim it has been skewed to support.

There must be some advantages that make adopting this bias worth the costs. My hypothesis is that the advantages are perceived epistemological advantages.

Note: It might be argued that physicalism excludes “not physical” phenomena from the domain of existence on the basis of induction. In other words, all extant evidence supports the claim that “physical” things do exist and no extant evidence supports the existence of “not physical” things, so all that we should expect to exist are “physical” things. This of course entails the problem of induction. Beyond this, though, physicalism overextends itself. Physicalism does not overextend itself with regard to the existence of the “physical” but with regard to the non-existence of the “not physical.” The most that physicalism can say is that we lack evidence supporting the existence of “not physical” things. This is a far cry from saying that we have evidence precluding the existence of “not physical” things.

Physicalism is just one example. I could have mentioned other ontological claims, including theistic claims as well as opposing atheistic claims.

In light of how small our knowledge is compared to that big sea out there just teaming with information that we are still ignorant of, it seems strange to draw hard lines, i.e., constraints, that preclude information discovery in certain predetermined directions or past certain predetermined boundaries. Any such constraints are, of course, made well into areas of our ignorance. Clearly, these constraints are supported by miniscule amounts of knowledge when compared to the abundance of information we have yet to discover. Why do we display such inordinate commitment to these constraints?

Ontological claims such as physicalism are necessary in order to begin thinking at all. We have to start somewhere, after all. My concern isn't the fact that we make such claims or that we make one claim rather than another claim. I am interested in why we are so motivated, once we make them, to cling to these claims as tightly as we do and defend them as tenaciously as we do. Our zeal in doing this seems, in a very real sense, religious.

Provisional claims are one thing. When intelligent people regard their ontological claims as if they were supported evidentially when that "support" is largely a function of circular rationalization, it is puzzling to say the least.

There must be a reason that we do so much of this. I'm looking for that reason.

Any comments?

[Gareth Southwell]

This is very interesting, and I think I have great sympathy with much of what you say.

I think you make an important distinction here: on the one hand, there are things that we can know about and have knowledge of, so it makes sense to concentrate on those in order to increase our knowledge (this is a positivist approach); secondly, there is the further step of saying that those things which we cannot have conclusive knowledge of are therefore non-existent, or involve confused claims. As you point out, physicalism is an example of this, and can be traced all the way back to the birth of science - you must have empirical proof for claims to knowledge. However, as you point out, it is a dubious step to go from "we can only have knowledge of X" to "X is all that exists". In other words, to move from epistemological concerns (how we can know things) to ontological assertions (what exists). As you point out, this move also involves a form of fallacy: we define X as not existing, and then prove that X doesn't exist! But why define X in that way? The problem of consciousness is a key example of this: physicalists will always struggle to account for it, because - by definition - they exclude what makes it distinctive (subjective experience). I therefore think you are 100% right in this!

However, the next question - why the move from epistemology to ontology takes place - is a more difficult one. Nietzsche is one of the first to ask it, and to point out that the forms of our knowledge are not pre-existing objective categories, but rather spring from deep-seated and irrational motivations. To ask why they form is therefore to ask why such motivations exist. Regarding physicalism and positivism in general, for instance, he argued that the tendency to reduce everything in this way (the scientific tendency, as it has become) is an expression of the desire to negate an aspect of life. He called this the "religious neurosis", whereby the urge to turn one's back on the world, and deny certain aspects of it, springs from the powerlessness of the dispossessed (the "slaves") who wish to assert themselves, and must deny power, strength, etc., to do it. THe main expression of this is therefore sacrifice, and the urge ultimately results in the sacrifice of our most dear ideals - knowledge, truth, God. As Nietzsche puts it (one of my favourite quotes): there are those who "in the end always prefers a handful of 'certainty' to a whole cartload of beautiful possibilities". So, he argues, the move from a particular epistemological concern with certainty overrides other types of approach to knowledge, and prescribes what 'legitimate' knowledge must involve.

Of course, I'm not necessarily suggesting that Nietzsche is right here, or that this is the only answer to your question, but it's an important possibility.

One final observation. I think anyone wanting to use this observation to undermine (e.g.) physicalism, is in danger of falling into a trap. For instance, it is tempting (for e.g. religious believers) to argue that there are things "beyond the physical". Now, there might have been a time where this made sense, but for moderns - who exist largely within a framework dictated by scientific positivism - it is difficult to make sense of these words, for "physical" now basically means "all that exists". What would need to be done therefore is to show that the word cannot meant that - which involves backtracking and unweaving a whole cultural outlook (difficult!).

Interesting topic though.

[skeptic23]

Gareth,

I have no interest in undermining physicalism, because it is useful and any "weaknesses" it has aren't specific to that brand of ontology but are characteristic of all "brands," or rather characteristic of the underlying approaches we all use to formulate our "brands." I'm more interested in our tendency to be epistemologically clingy and defensive in our devotion to one "brand" over another. I find the same tendency among atheists as I do among theists, so it's got to be a function of the way we think, not of a particular world-view.

Thanks for mentioning Nietszche. I'm trying to plow through him and having trouble seeing the forest for the many, many trees in the way he writes. Why can't these guys just say exactly what they mean? I used to think that verbosity was necessary to get our minds twisted around in such a way that we could grasp patterns of thought which would otherwise remain foreign to us. I doubt that more and more.

You seem well-acquainted with available philosophical thought. Are you aware of anyone who tried or is trying to approach philosophy backwards? What I mean by that is that most philosophers have tried to establish metaphysical and epistemological foundations first, then on that platform address ethical concerns. I'm aware of Levinas, but are there others who have started with an ethics-related foundation? I'm especially interested with anyone who starts with human desire as the starting point, i.e., start with what we want as given, then decide what is and should be and how we can know about it.

[Gareth Southwell]

Well, if you have no interest in undermining any one particular approach, then you are assuming that it is possible to step back from all approaches and to adopt some sort of 'meta' position. I think, to be honest, this is what most of continental philosophy has been obsessed with since Nietzsche, and - with some exceptions - I think it leads to sterility and (arguably) nonsense! I think the problem is that in stepping back, we assume that there is somewhere to step back to, as if getting closer to truth is just a matter of gaining a bigger perspective. However, whilst bigger perspectives are occasionally useful, they also have drawbacks - chiefly, that we lose focus on the purpose of things - the fine detail that make things important. So, as regards philosophy, whilst Derrida ingeniously tries to show how all philosophy is just another view of the world (none of which is more fundamental or 'better' than any other), he ends up not really saying anything 'useful' at all. This is just my opinion, and I certainly don't wish to suggest that all modern continental philosophy is of this nature, but it is certainly a key trend.

However, an example of where this approach has been used interestingly, is with Foucault, who in many ways continues Nietzsche's approach to society, knowledge and culture. What distinguishes Foucault from Derrida, in my view, is that he seems to be actually interested in more than just exposing how 'everything is relative' (to put it simply). His work on madness, sexuality, power, etc, is relevant to modern society because it allows us to 'step back' for a purpose: is 'madness' or 'crime' defined by the ruling power elite for their own purposes? However, Derrida seems more interested not in the applications of this knowledge, but in playing some sort of metaphysical game. Anyway, rant over!

As for Nietzsche, I would recommend beginning with "Beyond Good and Evil" with a good guide book.

[skeptic23]

Gareth, thanks, and I agree. Great suggestions, I've never read Foucault. I like Nietzsche's passion, though. I practically don't give a writer a chance if they come at this stuff like a clinician, even though my original post would qualify for "clinical" in my opinion. Hey, it's a work in progress.

Your comments on "meta" positions becoming sterile is my view as well. I'm wondering why that is. My suspicion is that it's a function of the epistemological direction we assume for philosophy per se, i.e., looking for some sort of "objective" approach. So, in taking a larger view, we assume yet another level of abstraction into a larger, more general context/frame of reference, etc. No wonder it feels more remote from the things that matter to us.

I'm trying to think of alternatives, i.e., "other" rather than "bigger." Why do we conceive of knowledge in terms of an objective/subjective spectrum anyway?  Idealist or realist, what both ends of that ontological spectrum have in common is that they separate the philosophical perspective from reality in order to contemplate reality. Why do we think in terms of one-dimensional spectra, anyway?  Why this binary, either/or fetish? Could it be a function of our poor cognitive abilities rather than a function of the realities we're considering? Both ends of any spectrum lack things that seem obvious and important.

That's what's behind my wondering if anyone has started their philosophical approach with ethics. At least that would be different, maybe even informative.

Maybe the most important questions aren't 1) what is really there and 2) how we know it. What if we started with what we want? Wanting is something everyone has in common, and it's the crux of relevance. It's what we kill each other over.

Maybe the sterility of philosophy as a whole is because we objectify everything before we start dealing with it. Philosophers act like they come to the table like beings which are something other (more?) than human, trying to approximate god's-eye-views of reality and truth from each their little knot holes, and now collectively with scientists through scientific knowledge. And although Eastern experiential/mystical knowledge avoids that act of distancing when experiencing "one-with" knowledge, it doesn't avoid the act of distancing when discussing that knowledge: how to get it, what to do with it, and how it informs the consciousness that prompted us to find it beyond merely discounting that consciousness.

Everyone seems to believe that there might be a way around the fact that we only have little slices of information as a basis from which to talk philosophy or anything else. Even if we put them all together and, wonder of wonders, agreed for even an instant, we still would have just a little sliver. What if we started with accepting that we don't know much, but we know what we want?

[Gareth Southwell]

Well, you are reading like a proper Nietzschean! This critique of objectivity, the idea that how we see the world is coloured and shaped by what we want to see, and the claim that philosophy has generally adopted a God-like view are all pure Nietzsche! So, a patient study of "Beyond Good and Evil", and Foucault, will certainly put you on the right track for the answers you are looking for.

As for things starting with ethics, as you say, Levinas is an obvious place to start, with his notion of the Other and it's role in determining how we act, think, etc. However, it is a debatable point as to whether ethical concerns are what give birth to metaphysics. Even if they are, it might even be the case that this is only true for certain types of people or even cultures. One interesting consequence of Nietzsche's view is that it allows for different types of 'drive' (to use his term). One might be sensual, another practical, yet another emotional - do you see what I'm saying? If there are various competing influences upon the individual, then there must be individuals (or even cultures) where different ones predominate. Just thinking aloud really.

As for starting with 'what we want', and acknowledging that each of us has our own limited perspective (known as 'perspectivism' - Nietzsche again!), I think the problem is that we DON'T agree on what we want. As suggested above, the different views of reality may stem from fundamentally different ways of responding to experience. For instance, in BGAE Nietzsche traces the whole ascetic philosophy (which eventually gives birth to scientific materialism) to the 'slave' morality, and the feeling of powerlessness that the dispossessed feel. Now, if even something like this is true, then it suggests that what people want is different according to environment, upbringing, genetics and biology, and basically a whole host of factors that are largely unconscious. This is the problem with Sartre's existentialism: we do not have absolute freedom, because we cannot choose the basis of our choices!

So, agreeing what we want is secondary to possessing a whole host of inclinations and tastes that determine our choices (to an extent). What Nietzsche and Foucault do is therefore to begin to identify these  various influences, and to show how they structure what people often think of as objectivity.

By the way, I'm sure there are other continental philosophers who are in sympathy with this approach, but I'm not hugely knowledgeable in this area. Anyone?

[badioutothebone]

By the way, I'm sure there are other continental philosophers who are in sympathy with this approach, but I'm not hugely knowledgeable in this area. Anyone?

If you're after people who look at the structures which construct our view of objectivity, then I guess you could go follow Foucault to the other thinkers surrounding him: Marcuse (and his criticisms of analytic philosophy in "One Dimensional Man"), perhaps Althusser and if you wanted to be all trendy then you could try Zizek and his critiques of ideology and how desire is constructed.  I don't know whether that offends people's tastes though.

[skeptic23]

Gareth,

I actually didn't mean start with what we want, but start with the fact that we all want. In other words, start with something that is experientially real and relevant to what matters to us.

Why do we want to do philosophy anyway, so that we can prove that we're "right" and amaze our friends?

Philosophy has chronically followed certain habits that are so deep-seated that we don't even wonder if there are alternatives. Why did it make sense to Descartes to doubt everything and only accept what he found himself unable to doubt? That is a certain kind of certainty. I'm sure that he didn't get romantically involved with anyone that way.

"Let's see, I can't rely on my feeling that I'm attracted to that woman. (assuming he was hetero) It might be a trick. I must doubt that I am overcome with longing for her and wait until I have absolutely no doubt that I indeed want her."

He finally gives in, woos her, and she falls in love with him.

"Rene, I love you!"

"Hmmm... I can't just believe her. It might be a trick. She might not really love me. It might be a passing fancy. She might be after my estate. She might just want me as a trophy husband."

If Descartes actually lived in a way that was consistent with his epistemological approach, I predict (retroactive prediction, since I've never read his bio) that he was tragically single.

I got inspired yesterday and wrote a little piece on wanting. It's on my blog if you're interested: http://millardjmelnyk.wordpress.com/

Today I'm tempted to tackle logic. Propositional logic is an interesting process. In order for it to work, you first have to kill its subject matter (define it) and stuff it (formalize it), then you can set it up in a collection of other killed and stuffed subjects in a little museum (system of thought.) This isn't a wasted occupation, any more than museums are. The problem is that we make so much more of it than we should. And the proof is in the pudding: no one, not even logicians, use logic as their primary tool in decision-making when it comes to the most important personal matters, matters of the heart. And if we don't have a logic that we can apply to matters of the heart, where are we?

What if we could come up with an alternative to the approach that philosophy has used so far, you know, the one that produces volumes of gibberish text that makes sense to no one except a fraction of the philosophical community who consider it worth their while to twist their minds around yet another paradigm? Have you ever tried to read Levinas? I felt badly after giving up in frustration a few years ago. I'm sure that he has wonderful things to say, and maybe I'll give him another try. Regardless, all the wonderful things he has to say would need a couple of levels of translation before anyone except the select few could understand it well enough to get any benefit out of it.

Is the complexity of philosophical thought (or at least its expression) a function of the complexity of the subject matter or a function of our own laziness, or is it something more insidious? It can be necessary to engage in unnecessarily convoluted thinking in the early stages of forming an understanding. However, if it is worth anything at all, the understanding will relate well enough to discernible reality so that we will be able to make some pretty simple sense of it at some point. If we can't do that, the understanding will remain irrelevant to us. Even homeless people have heard of quantum mechanics. Even grade school kids can tell you the parts of an atom. And everyone over the age of, say, 15 has a mental image of what an atom looks like. Why do philosophers think that their job is done once they have declared a "solution?" Even theoretical physicists publish popular works so that the layperson can understand what they are doing. Besides, it's lucrative, as I'm sure Stephen Hawking could confirm.

Philosophers resemble religious thinkers in that they claim some grasp of truth, but then leave everyone else to come up to their level in order to get a useful grasp on it. Sometimes I wonder if it doesn't just boil down to obfuscation. Maybe it's all smoke and mirrors. It might as well be for all the benefit most people get out of it, which is clearly very little. By the time that most philosophical thinking percolates down to the people who could benefit from it, it has gone through so many intermediaries that it has lost the one thing that differentiates it from religious thinking: amenability to critique and verification. You can't critique or verify what you have to take some expert's word for just to understand. And then, if you do put all that time and work into getting a grasp on it, you look at what you have grasped and look at what you need and wonder why you bothered. Maybe we should rename the discipline with the Greek equivalent of "love of the obscure" or "love of the esoteric" or "love of riddles" instead of "love of wisdom," unless I misunderstand what wisdom is supposed to be about. Regardless, I know what I need wisdom to be about, and I haven't found much love of it in philosophy.

Logicians blame the illogical for their lack of logic. Maybe they should blame themselves for putting so much stock in a method that has no more relevance to the things that matter to the rest of us than museums do to people who want to interact with the real thing. At least zoos keep 'em alive. And there's always safari... or even living there! But who wants to do that?

Just saying.

[skeptic23]

badio...

Thanks for the references. I just ordered The Parallax View. I'm going to look into Foucalt, too.

I was curious about your comment on offending tastes. What did you mean?

[skeptic23]

Gareth, a PS. I'm very much enjoying Nietzsche! It's like we are looking at the same things, prompting many of the same questions. I have a feeling that our answers won't tend to agree so much, as should be hoped over a century later. What would be the fun in that, anyway? Thanks for pointing me his direction.

[Gareth Southwell]

Hi Skeptic23,

Glad you're enjoying Nietzsche. I'm with you on the irritating obscurity of certain philosophers, so I'm glad you're appreciating Nietzsche, because he is difficult and obscure - but not, perhaps, in the way that some modern philosophers are.

As to why we philosophise, or why philosophers are obscure, it's difficult to say. To cut them some slack, I think you have to admit that philosophy is difficult. So, you might argue that, just as quantum physics is inaccessible to the layman except in a very diluted and popularised form, so philosophy is too. However, I think many philosophers - analytic and continental - need a reality check, and as you say to stand back and think what relevance their work really has for people. I think the truth would be a bit uncomfortable for them. However, we also need to be careful about defining things purely in terms of usefulness and relevance - both of which are subjective and relative.

However, I generally agree, and also take you point about logic. But here again it's difficult to draw a precise line between pointless speculation and work which ultimately leads to somewhere important. Take, for example, Godel's incompleteness theorem. Now, I don't pretend to understand any of the arguments that he presents, but I get the general gist: the foundations of maths are not provable within maths itself. Now, as a general conclusion, this has far-reaching consequences for all our knowledge. If someone were to come along and say, "Kurt, this is pointless - why don't you think about something more useful?", then we wouldn't have any of this. So, perhaps we need to put up with a lot of what - with hindsight - turns out to be unproductive navel-gazing and hair-splitting in order to uncover the occasional piece of gold.

However, you generally seem to be heading along an existentialist path: philosophy should deal with what it is like to be human, the deep questions of who we are and what we should do with life. I agree also, but I think there is room for lots of different approaches.

[skeptic23]

Hi Gareth,

Interesting post.

Usefulness and relevance as subjective and relative. Maybe we have overrated objectivity and the grail of the absolute. I think so. Objectivity is another one of those things that everyone seems to firmly believe is a good thing. At the same time, no one seems to have seriously considered alternatives to it, so I take their convictions about it with a grain of salt or two. I've noticed that there is little need for "objectivity" unless I'm trying to convince people who don't trust what I say. If I'm not trying to convince someone, objectivity isn't an issue. If they trust what I'm saying, objectivity isn't an issue. Couples don't usually start couples counseling just because they have issues. They bring "objective" third parties into the picture when trust becomes an issue. Would we have ever resorted to "objectivity" if we never lied to each other and never tried to make each other do what we don't want to do? Hypothetically speaking.

I actually didn't imply that philosophy, logic, math, etc., are pointless. Far from it. I just take issue with making them be-alls and end-alls. Math and science seem to have turned the corner in the 20th Century from noble human undertakings to become the closest things that we have to truly global religions. We believe in them, and our faith in them extends far beyond their capabilities. I take issue with any thinking that extends beyond what its foundations can support.

I found myself agreeing with you about Godel and his theorem. My understanding of the theorem is 2nd-hand, (tried reading that, too, but I ain't no mathematician,) so I defer to Ray Kurzweil's description, which jives with other descriptions I've read:

Early in the twentieth century mathematicians Alfred North Whitehead and
Bertrand Russell published their seminal work, Principia Mathematica, which
sought to determine axioms that could serve as the basis for all of mathematics.
However, they were unable to prove conclusively that an axiomatic system
that can generate the natural numbers (the positive integers or counting
numbers) would not give rise to contradictions. It was assumed that such a
proof would be found sooner or later, but in the 1930s a young Czech mathematician,
Kurt Godel, stunned the mathematical world by proving that within
such a system there inevitably exist propositions that can be neither proved
nor disproved. It was later shown that such unprovable propositions are as
common as provable ones. Godel's incompleteness theorem, which is fundamentally
a proof demonstrating that there are definite limits to what logic,
mathematics, and by extension computation can do, has been called the most
important in all mathematics, and its implications are still being debated.
The Singularity Is Near, p. 453

Then I got to thinking (always a risky proposition.) If we generalized math to any system of thought and then generously attributed the rigor of math to all systems of thought, (let's just say we're now in the year 5010 and can do such things,) we could have it one of two ways: 1) there are propositions in all of our systems of thought which can neither be proved or disproved or, 2) we limit our systems of thought to those propositions which can be proved or disproved, thus precluding the contradictions that Russell and Whitehead struggled to eliminate, and thereby render the systems irrelevant (e.g., incapable of generating the natural numbers.) We can't have our cake and eat it, too.

So what is the difference between Godel's unprovable propositions and the notion of basic beliefs? see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_belief Not much, I'd say.

I think that our obsession with getting rid of those pesky unprovable propositions reveals a couple of things. First, that we are really uncomfortable with the fact that our cognition has limitations, of which Godel's pesky propositions and basic beliefs are functions. Second, that we imbue artifacts of cognition with a sense of reality that takes them outside the domain of the cognitive. Philosophy is full of examples of logic that makes no sense unless you first attribute metaphysical reality to cognitive artifacts. Dualism is a great example. Just because we can't understand reality without thinking dualistically doesn't mean that reality is dualistic. I also think that another example is viewing mathematics as an attribute of reality rather than as a way of describing certain attributes of reality. There are always two things: what is and what we say about it, (unless we say nothing.) Somehow, after we say something about it, we are sorely tempted to believe that what we said is on an existential par with what we said it about, and we often go so far as to let what we said take precedence. Words don't transform into sticks and stones, even when we pick up sticks and stones.

So, back to Godel, I'd say that his theorem was very important for certain types of people, i.e., people who need that type of proof in order to accept the truth of something. Aside from them, Godel's proof was overkill. I'm glad for it, because it helps when I'm talking to the type of people who value such things. I'm thinking, for example, of people who require heavy math for what they are doing, and so, put a lot of stock in it. More interestingly, I'm also thinking about people who can't do the heavy math but who think that it's important that others who can do the math claim that Godel proved something. That brings me to the irony of modern epistemology.

We are so far past the point where any one person could master enough of what we need to know in order to do what we need to do that I just laugh when "rational" people object to the notion of faith. I laugh. Because I have read Kurzweil or the Encyclopedia Britannica or a zillion other sources and saw that everyone claims that Godel proved his incompleteness theorem, in what way did I conclude that the claim is true that is different than the way anyone concludes that gods exist or that life on earth was seeded by aliens? When I hear that Susskind won the bet with Hawking about black hole radiation, how do I know that he was right or that either one of them knows what they are talking about? Do I really have enough knowledge to judge?

We seem to think that phenomena like paranormal theories, conspiracy theories, and religions are functions of faults in the intelligence of the theorists and their adherents. Maybe they are rather indications of faults in our current versions of "rationality." When we have to take the words of so many people in order to supply our rationality with content, I'd argue that we are far more credulous and believing now than ever. And if our sanctioned, "rational" versions of knowledge were so compellingly comprehensive and satisfying, wouldn't the "irrational" versions start disappearing? I see a huge gap and have for a long time. Proponents of "rationality" just seem to find ways of dismissing the validity of the gap. I don't think that we'll ever get rid of religious crazies, for example, by telling them that the reasons that they turned to religion are all wrong. I think that maybe we can have an effect if we understand what they were looking for when they turned to religion and provide them with ways of understanding things that will satisfy them without making them crazy. And to listen to them, it's the very hubris of our "rationality" that is making them crazy, not their religions. Who is to say that they don't have a point?

As you can tell, I love this stuff. Please feel free to take me to task. Everything is a straw man just waiting to be knocked down. Truth is just the straw men that nobody managed to knock down.

[Gareth Southwell]

I think you need to be careful about assuming that "everyone" thinks that objectivity is a good idea. Since at least Nietzsche's time (in modern philosophy), there has been a growing trend of questioning the basis of knowledge, and the motive of those seeking objectivity. This trickle is now a torrent, and you might even argue that the whole of continental philosophy after a certain date takes this as a given. So...straw man?

As for Godel, I think his conclusions can be taken to a more sceptical extreme. It's not so much that some propositions can be proven, whilst others can't; it is that even the provable propositions are only relative to the system. This is a point made by W.V.O. Quine - all 'certainty' and 'objectivity' are relative to a system. Now, the system itself - whether maths, or a philosophical theory of perception, or whatever - exists ultimately as a free-floating thing, without foundation. It may be COHERENT, but it's coherence is not a guarantee of certain absolute truth. Now, if - as science attempts to - we argue that we can reduce one system to another - chemistry to physics, for example - then we still need to find a basis for physics. And so we have an infinite regress.

As for rationality, I agree. Certain people tend to use it as a stick to hit others with, whereas - as you point out - it is not fit for the job. To be rational simply means 'to have reasons'. Now, some atheists and scoffers seem to assume that there is something identifiable about irrational belief or behaviour that marks it as separate from its rational brother. So, astronomy is rational; astrology, irrational. Now, this isn't necessarily so, for - and this is Godel and Quine's chief contribution - what is 'rational' is only relative to a host of other beliefs (some of which must just be accepted or believed in). 'Bad' theories are equally based on 'reasons' - so what makes them bad theories? This is interesting. I agree that people increasingly take things on trust - we are (most of us) not fit to judge what Hawking or Susskind say, but are merely reliant upon such people to tell us what a 'good' reason is. For instance, those who deny God, spirit, etc., are reliant upon a certain scientific perspective telling us why such things cannot exist. But what if they are wrong? It's all a mighty big mess.

[badioutothebone]

badio...

Thanks for the references. I just ordered The Parallax View. I'm going to look into Foucalt, too.

I was curious about your comment on offending tastes. What did you mean?

My point about taste is because I know that in the UK continental philosophy is quite often dismissed out of hand.  When I was doing my MA someone in a seminar mentioned Foucault and the lecturer made a scoffing noise and said "Foucault?  That's a habit you want to get out of..." and moved on without a further mention of the quite reasonable point the student had made.  They're not universally hated, but mentioning Marcuse rather than Moore can lead you to be ignored.  As Gareth has mentioned elsewhere, continental philosophy can descend into nonsense and I fully accept that, but too many people chuck the baby out with the bathwater (just as it would be a mistake to dismiss all analytic philosophy after the collapse of logical positivism).

Parallax View is a nice start I think.  For what you're after, I'd suggest "Plague of Fantasies" or "The Sublime Object of Ideology" (the latter is possibly the best introduction to his overall philosophy.  He's moved away from it a bit, but it sets up the debates).  If you're after Foucault, then the Foucault Reader edited by Rabinow is a good way to get a solid overview.  If you fancy something a bit more focussed then you could go for "Discipline and Punish" or his History of Sexuality.  The reader contains his essay on Nietzsche, which is useful if you've been delving into "Beyond Good and Evil".

[Gareth Southwell]

Hey, and don't get taken in as I was: "Foucault's Pendulum" is nothing at all to do with Michel!