Metaethics (and stepping back from that)

[Alexander]

Does anyone know of a system that steps back from Descriptive, Normative, and Metaethics?

Can we not all class them as the same in the sense that they are each trying to draw a conclusion out of something else. Would this system be called something like "Supra-ethics" or "Post-meta ethics" or even " Infinitive Ethics"

I''ll say more when I''m not tired, If you don''t feel like I''ve made anysense at all (that''s propably a good thing when talking philosophy), then I''ll try and present my ideas more logically.

Gooday,

Alex

[Gareth Southwell]

This is an interesting point, I think. What you have with descriptive, normative and metaethics is a gradual process of stepping back: we describe what is moral within a given moral system; that system itself justifies moral actions by appeal to some feature (correspondence with an ideal, moral law, utilitarian calculation, etc.), and then metaethics analyses these various moral approaches.

To step back from this again would be to generate a sort of meta-metaethics, which looked at the need to classify moral theories, perhaps (or using some other criterion which allowed us to step back). This is possible, but it is something that gets more abstract and difficult and perhaps more general (so, more about philosophy and less about ethics itself). Also, I don't think this could keep happening (e.g. meta-meta-metaethics) without getting pointlessly confusing - and disappearing somewhere where the sun don't shine!

Having said that, there are various approaches which try to step back in this way. Nietzsche does it to a certain extent, and in a sense his whole philosophy can be seen as a stepping back from traditional philosophical concerns in order to ask subtler questions. Also, this seems to be a theme running through post-modern continental philosophy - e.g. Foucault, Derrida, etc. In fact, from my understanding (which is admittedly little in this regard) Deconstruction seems to involve nothing but stepping back and reinterpreting traditional questions in a new light.

However, as I've said, there is a limit to this, and whilst it can be very illuminating when you have something interesting to say, it is pointless to do it just because you can. Also, however, there would appear to be logical limits. For instance, if I want to step back and show how some theory or philosopher - or even a whole philosophical tradition - is driven by some prejudice, or some view of the world, then what is there to stop someone accusing me of the same type of thing? This is a constant problem for such things as Deconstruction, and is a common criticism of Nietzsche himself.

Sorry for the length of the post - hope this helps!

[Alexander]

This is interesting because what you have written leads me think that a more absurdist situation arises for : everything we criticise will be criticised itself thus leading to no common conclusions. On an ethical basis Metaethics only produces conclusions but no suggestions thus much more philosophical than lets say normative ethics. So yes, if we take a step back from Meta-ethics, we create one new and final group, (infinitive metaethics). This will look at and draw conclusions on every sort of Metaethic. If that itself is then studied, its still in the same category because of what it does. There is no "new way of thinking" involved in studying a furthered meta-meta¹⁰⁰-ethic because it's doing the same thing as all the others.

I can't actually see the benefit of even really taking it any further than a meta-metaethics, since as I just mentioned it doesn't create anything new. So I think I've just argued agains my own post aha, but that was never to say I said, just an objective comment.


I unfortunately don't know a great deal about Nietzche as he doesn't really feature in my course a great deal.

I hope you didn't find my post confusing.

Alex

[Gareth Southwell]

I haven't got a problem with meta-metaethics itself, or whether we would be caught in some infinite regress of metas! - it's just that this is the sort of thing philosophy does anyway: that is, stand back and take a look at its assumptions. Every now and then a particularly bright spark (a Nietzche or a Wittgenstein) will do this in a more fundamental way, and call a whole tradition into question. However, on the whole, philosophy is all about 'not forgetting what you're sitting on' as you might call it (your assumptions!).

So, I don't have a problem with the concept of meta-metaethics, but until you've got some profound insights to justify the extra 'meta' then to me your still just doing metaethics (or even just investigating the foundations of moral philosophy).

[Alexander]

No, fair point definatly. Thanks for your help,

Alex

[Gareth Southwell]

You're welcome - thanks for posting (an interesting topic).