Labels make things easier, don't they? But they also over-simplify. I think you can broadly characterise the difference between continental and Anglo-American philosophy in this way, but you are only really identifying two very general trends, to which there are exceptions and examples of subtle synthesis.
However, as long as we don't think of two 'camps', it can be useful I think. Generally, I think Anglo-American philosophy does shy away from some of the more subtle questions, especially to do with notions of being, phenomenal consciousness, self, interpretation, etc. In short, the more subjective and slippery aspects of knowledge and knowing. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, etc., whilst they differ greatly in their approaches, generally share a greater sensitivity to these issues. On the other hand, to generalise greatly, Anglo-American philosophy is often more constrained in its outlook, and concentrates on more concrete questions of concept formation, justification and proof, and so on.
I think, in a rash but well-meaning attempt to characterise the two approaches more simply, we might say: Anglo-American philosophy is still asking the traditional and basic philosophical questions - what is the world, and how can we know it? - and steers clear of topics which - whilst interesting - seem difficult to pin down and analyse without danger of disappearing where the sun don't shine (How can we make sense of 'being'? It seems too subjective and abstract to be instructive.). On the other hand, continental philosophy is more literary; it takes more account of our subjective experience of life and gives it more weight. Never mind the 'real' philosophical questions - what is 'real'? Never mind the mind-body problem - what is the significance of our subjective experience of the world, its relation to knowledge, etc? Broadly, A-A philosophy is objective, still looking for the limits of what we can know and prove; Con philosophy is subjective and sceptical, undermining the objective viewpoint with a view to prioritising and analysing the phenomena of experience, its psychologically shaped perspectives, etc.
It is interesting to note where these two schools come into conflict. For instance, some A-A philosophers (e.g. Daniel Dennett) have even reached a point where their objectivity has caused them to doubt the mere existence of subjective phenomena (consciousness). I think this would be anathema to Con philosophy, which puts a higher value on subjectivity.
No doubt this is a gross oversimplification, and will cause more clued-up academics to reach for their keyboards (please do!). However, I think there is no harm in identifying broad trends in this way. This said, however, there is much more cross fertilisation than the above picture supposes. Most A-A philosophers of a broader view will have to acknowledge many of the founding fathers of the continental view in their own work - e.g. Kant and Nietzsche. And, once you do this, you open up the door to an understanding of those influenced by these figures (e.g. Sartre, Heidegger, Foucault). So, whilst A-A philosophers like Ayer once rejected philosophers such as Heidegger as 'nonsense' (and some still will), modern philosophy departments (with their multi-national makeup) are not so partisan.
