Meditation IV

The Cause of Error
  1. What two reasons does Descartes give for concluding that God is not a deceiver? (2 marks) - Answer
  2. Thinking of himself and his own qualities, Descartes concludes that “I am, as it were, a mean between God and nothing”. What does he mean by this? What role does this idea play in his understanding of why he is occasionally mistaken? (2 marks) - Answer
  3. What two general reasons does Descartes consider for his not possessing a more powerful intellect? (2 marks) - Answer
Firstly, he argues that all deception springs from imperfection (and God is perfect). (1 mark) Secondly, the motive for deception is “malice and weakness”, which qualities cannot be found in God. (1 mark) Descartes argues that – as a human being – he is not only aware of God (total perfection and truth), but also “nothing” – or the opposite of God. So, human beings – who are neither perfect nor nothing – exist midway between these two qualities. (1 mark) Descartes then uses this idea to show that his tendency for error need have nothing to do with God, but rather involves Descartes’s occasional inability to distinguish between that which is true (springs from God), and that which is false (comes from “nonbeing”). The ultimate reason is therefore that Descartes has a finite mind (not an infinite one, like God). (1 mark) First of all, there is no reason why he – Descartes – should be able to understand the ways of God, and why He has given him such limited powers. (1 mark) Also, we should not consider this fact in isolation, but look at it in relation to God’s creation as a whole, wherein it may make more sense. (1 mark) Faulty Faculties
  1. What does Descartes conclude about the relative power of the faculties of understanding and will? Which of these faculties is responsible for error? (3 marks) - Answer
  2. What does Descartes mean by “indifference”? What role does it play in the avoidance of error? (2 marks) - Answer
  3. But why didn’t God give us a more powerful understanding, or at least a greater tendency not to accept ideas which were not clear and distinct? (2 marks) - Answer
  4. In criticising Descartes here, what might we say about the notion of “indifference”? Illustrate your answer. (2 marks) - Answer
  5. How could we criticise Descartes’s use of the idea of God in this argument? List two possible criticisms. (3 marks) - Answer
The understanding is finite, but whilst there are things that he does not possess knowledge of, there may be no good reason why he should know such things (therefore, it is not a defect in him). (1 mark) However, the will is infinite in power, because it merely involves being able to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to things (which he can always do). (1 mark) Therefore, error arises when he does not refrain from believing those things which are not clearly and distinctly true. (1 mark) Descartes argues that clear and distinct ideas almost compel us to accept their truth, whereas those ideas which are not clear and distinct leave us indifferent. (1 mark) So, if we only accept those perceptions which are clear and distinct, and continue to doubt the truth of those perceptions which are not, then we should avoid error. (1 mark) Descartes’s general answer to this is the one given earlier: that we cannot really know that God, in His wisdom, has not arranged things for the best (we have limited understanding!.) (1 mark) However, he also goes on to say that God has given him freewill, and the capacity to not be mistaken, and that therefore he has ample means not to fall into error. (1 mark) Whether or not we feel that certain truths are clear and distinct, or feel indifferent to them, would seem to a degree to be a subjective thing. (1 mark) For instance, a person living in the 14th century might feel “indifferent” to the idea that the world was round, whilst clearly and distinctly perceiving that the Earth goes around the Sun. (1 mark) The problem then for Descartes is distinguishing between wanting something to be true, and clearly and distinctly perceiving that it is true. Some modern critics might say that Descartes is naïve in this respect, in that he does not allow for self-deception and unconscious desire to believe. Firstly, many would consider that simply saying that we cannot know the reasons God may have for doing things is not a good basis for accepting that we have been created to perceive truth. (1 mark) Also, there is the question of what might be called ‘benign deception’ – for instance, God might deceive us as to the nature of things in order to protect or help us (just as we might tell children half-truths in order to protect their innocence). (1 mark) However, perhaps the most telling objection is the possibility of a circular argument: Descartes needs to prove that God is not a deceiver in order to trust clear and distinct ideas; but he knows God exists (and is not a deceiver) because he clearly and distinctly perceives it (this has become known as the Cartesian Circle). (1 mark)

How Did You Do?

0-6: Indifferent. Lots of work to do still – maybe if you just concentrate on withholding belief from false ideas?

7-13: Finite. A fairly sound grasp of the arguments, but some work needed still.

14-18: Perfection. You really are quite good, aren’t you? I’m starting to think that you’re cheating in some way…

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