Meditations Overview
| Meditation | Arguments | Subject |
| First | Descartes asks the question, 'Of what can I be absolutely certain?' | The Argument from Illusion |
| He rejects the evidence of the senses, arguing that they too often prove unreliable. | ||
| However, he stops short of doubting everything he experiences (he would have to be mad to do that). | ||
| He considers whether or not he may be dreaming, and is forced to accept that he cannot be sure (for we may dream that we are awake). | The Dreaming Argument | |
| However, the images must come from somewhere. So, just as artists make up imaginary creatures (such as a centaurs) using real ideas (man, horse), so even our false ideas must ultimately be made up of simpler ideas which may correspond to reality in some way, or may in themselves be real. | ||
| He concludes that sciences such as maths and geometry are most trustworthy, as they do not rely on experience (but only a priori knowledge), nor do they assume the existence of physical objects. | ||
| He rejects God as a possible source of our own errors and tendency to be mistaken. But what if there were a ‘malignant demon' whose sole purpose it is to deceive us? | The Malignant Demon | |
| Second | The senses are untrustworthy, but who is responsible for these perceptions I have of the 'outside' world? | The Cogito |
| Either it is God (who would not deceive us), a malicious demon, or ourselves. | ||
| In the worst case scenario - that there is a malignant demon - we can still be sure of at least one thing: even if we are deceived, we must exist (as a thinking thing) in order to be deceived. At last! Something certain! | ||
| Descartes rejects mere descriptions of what he is - 'man', 'rational animal', etc. - as unsatisfactory. But what then is he? | A Thinking Thing | |
| He decides that the one thing common to all his actions is thought: therefore, he is a 'thinking thing' (Latin: res cogitans). | ||
| This ‘thinking thing’ is separate and distinct from his body, so there must also exist another non-thinking, 'extended substance' (Latin: res extensa). | ||
| In examining a piece of wax, he concludes that there is nothing about it - its size, shape, smell - that is not potentially subject to change. | The Wax Argument | |
| However, since the behaviour of the wax can be understood and predicted, its real nature therefore lies in our intellectual understanding of it (not merely the information from the senses). | ||
| Third | Division of thoughts into judgements, images and desires, only the first of which can be false. | Classification of Ideas |
| Classification of judgements involving adventitious ideas (originating from outside of himself), factitious ideas (created by himself), and innate ideas (present from birth). | ||
| Rejects the natural tendency to believe that adventitious ideas have an objective source (i.e. the physical world), because 'natural beliefs' can be mistaken. Also rejects the idea that he is not aware of creating these ideas himself, because he may possess some power responsible for them that he is not currently aware of. Therefore, he must find a better reason for believing that his perceptions of the outside world are in fact trustworthy. | ||
| Concludes that certain ideas (such as mathematical and logical ones) seem more clear and distinct than others (such as heat and cold), which are relative or uncertain. | Clear and Distinct Ideas | |
| The most clear and distinct idea seems to be that of God. | ||
| Concludes that all things must have as much reality in their cause as in their effect, and that God is the most real (clear and distinct) idea. | The Trademark Argument | |
| Rejects the idea that he himself is in some way responsible for the idea of God, and proposes that therefore the idea must have been placed in him almost like some trademark left by a craftsman (God) on his creation (Descartes). Therefore, He (God) exists. | ||
| Fourth | Rejects God as the possible source of human error (He is not a deceiver, because He is all good). | The Cause of Error/Faulty Faculties |
| Rejects the idea that his own faculty of judgement is responsible, because that was created by God. ‘Will’ is perfect and unlimited (we can always say 'no'), whilst ‘understanding’, though finite, is – for all we know – adequate for the purposes God intended. | ||
| Concludes that it is the misuse of the will (for which we are solely responsible) which is the cause of error, in that we do not stop ourselves passing judgement on those things we don’t know enough about (and feel ‘indifferent’ about). | ||
| Fifth | Decides that, since the ideas he has of physical objects partly correspond to mathematical and logical principles, then it is possible that the real world exists (it is a coherent idea). | Material Essence |
| Rejects the idea that (a) he himself is the cause of these ideas (they are factitious), because they contain properties which he cannot have foreseen; and (b) that he has learnt them from experience, because some things he has never experienced (such as a 10,000-sided shape). | ||
| Concludes that because these ideas are coherent, and must have come from somewhere outside him (are adventitious), then that it is likely – but not certain – that the physical world exists. | ||
| Concludes that because we have the idea of a perfect being (God), He must exist, because not to exist would mean that He is less perfect. | The Ontological Argument | |
| Rejects three objections to this argument on the grounds that we necessarily have the idea of a perfect being, who, by definition, must exist. | ||
| Sixth | Distinguishes between understanding (conception) and imagination, associating the first more closely with pure thought, and the second with representations of the physical world, and sensations relating to the body and senses. | The Separation of Mind and Body |
| The most certain things can be clearly and distinctly conceived of, but the least certain can only be imagined. Therefore, the further we get from clear and distinct perceptions, the more likely we are to fall into error. | ||
| Mind is more closely related to the body than the pilot is to his ship, because we feel the body's hurts immediately. However, both are potentially separate from one another, and we can conceive of the mind as existing without the body. | ||
| Rejecting God and himself as possible sources of sense impressions, he accepts the idea that they originate outside of him as the most likely possibility. | Sources of the Real World | |
| Distinguishes between natural assumptions (which are merely careless, unexamined judgements) and natural teachings (instinctive reactions to things – such as pain, pleasure, hunger, etc.). | Natural Teachings | |
| Rejects the idea that natural teachings are ‘faulty’ (and that God is responsible), arguing that they are merely limited (we sometimes have natural desires for things which are occasionally harmful – such as being thirsty when ill with ‘dropsy’). | ||
| Concludes that, although our senses and natural assumptions commonly lead us into error, they can provide useful information if we use our reason to keep them in check. |
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