Meditation I

Of The Things Of Which We May Doubt

Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. Summary

Being convinced for a long time that he needed to critically examine all his opinions and viewpoints once in his life, building up from a firm foundation of certainty, Descartes had however put off this difficult task. However, Descartes decides that he is now mature enough, free from anxiety and other cares, and so he will begin.

But, to this end, it will not be necessary for me to show that the whole of these are false--a point, perhaps, which I shall never reach; but as even now my reason convinces me that I ought not the less carefully to withhold belief from what is not entirely certain and indubitable, than from what is manifestly false, it will be sufficient to justify the rejection of the whole if I shall find in each some ground for doubt. Nor for this purpose will it be necessary even to deal with each belief individually, which would be truly an endless labor; but, as the removal from below of the foundation necessarily involves the downfall of the whole edifice, I will at once approach the criticism of the principles on which all my former beliefs rested. Summary

It will not be necessary, Descartes argues, either to find conclusively that all his current opinions are false, or to examine all those opinions individually. By examining his central opinions - such as the certain existence of the physical world - it will be enough to find an element of doubt in the beliefs in order to reject them. It can be seen from these first two paragraphs, that Descartes's method is foundationalist, in that it looks to establish ultimate principles on which to discover things which appear less certain.

All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived. Summary

As most of our information about the world is received through the senses, and having been deceived by them before, he observes that it may be wise not to trust them as a source of reliable knowledge. This is the first wave of doubt, as it has been called, and represents the first stage in Descartes's sceptical analysis of knowledge.

But it may be said, perhaps, that, although the senses occasionally mislead us respecting minute objects, and such as are so far removed from us as to be beyond the reach of close observation, there are yet many other of their informations (presentations), of the truth of which it is manifestly impossible to doubt; as for example, that I am in this place, seated by the fire, clothed in a winter dressing gown, that I hold in my hands this piece of paper, with other intimations of the same nature. But how could I deny that I possess these hands and this body, and withal escape being classed with persons in a state of insanity, whose brains are so disordered and clouded by dark bilious vapors as to cause them pertinaciously to assert that they are monarchs when they are in the greatest poverty; or clothed [in gold] and purple when destitute of any covering; or that their head is made of clay, their body of glass, or that they are gourds? I should certainly be not less insane than they, were I to regulate my procedure according to examples so extravagant. Summary

'dark bilious vapours': to be bilious was to suffer from an excess of bile, which was thought to make a person bad-tempered or angry. Descartes therefore imagines the brains of lunatics to be clouded by vapours arising from this bile (perhaps not literally). 'pertinaciously': Wilfully or stubbornly. 'gourds: dried and hollowed-out bodies of large, hard-skinned fruit, used as containers for liquid. Although the senses may at times deceive us, perhaps to doubt them completely - to the extent that we wonder if we are really here at all - would be to group ourselves with madmen and lunatics (who frequently imagine that they are kings, when they are not, or other absurd things).

Though this be true, I must nevertheless here consider that I am a man, and that, consequently, I am in the habit of sleeping, and representing to myself in dreams those same things, or even sometimes others less probable, which the insane think are presented to them in their waking moments. How often have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in bed? At the present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes wide awake; the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand consciously and with express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and, attentively considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished; and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now dreaming. Summary

Dreams sometimes present to us totally impossible things - such as the insane believe - as if they were real. However, dreams can also realistically portray everyday things and events (such as he is at this moment experiencing). In view of this, Descartes decides that it is perhaps impossible to be completely sure that what we experience is real and not a dream, and that there are 'no certain marks' which distinguish waking from dreaming. This, of course, is the famous dreaming argument, and the second wave of doubt.

Let us suppose, then, that we are dreaming, and that all these particulars--namely, the opening of the eyes, the motion of the head, the forth- putting of the hands--are merely illusions; and even that we really possess neither an entire body nor hands such as we see. Nevertheless it must be admitted at least that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of realities; and, therefore, that those general objects, at all events, namely, eyes, a head, hands, and an entire body, are not simply imaginary, but really existent. For, in truth, painters themselves, even when they study to represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most fantastic and extraordinary, cannot bestow upon them natures absolutely new, but can only make a certain medley of the members of different animals; or if they chance to imagine something so novel that nothing at all similar has ever been seen before, and such as is, therefore, purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is at least certain that the colors of which this is composed are real. And on the same principle, although these general objects, viz. [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and the like, be imaginary, we are nevertheless absolutely necessitated to admit the reality at least of some other objects still more simple and universal than these, of which, just as of certain real colors, all those images of things, whether true and real, or false and fantastic, that are found in our consciousness (cogitatio),are formed. Summary

'sirens': in Greek mythology, Sirens were half-woman, half-bird creatures who were thought to lure sailors to their death with their beautiful song. 'satyrs': in Greek mythology, woodland creatures who were the companions of the Gods Pan and Dionysus. They were depicted, like Pan, with the legs and horns of a goat. Even if we imagine, for argument's sake, that such a thing as our body is the product of a dream, we must - Descartes argues - accept that those imaginings are themselves based on really existing things (whatever they ultimately turn out to be). So, just as painters must make up imaginary creatures out of the characteristics of existing ones (in drawing a satyr - half man, half goat - for example), we must at least base our imaginings on simple ideas or qualities which in some sense actually exist. So, to illustrate Descartes's point, whether or not the red apple I am seeing actually exists, it is at least true that I have the ideas of redness and roundness. This distinction will be important for him later on when he comes to ask whether certain ideas come from experience (are 'a posteriori' - Latin, 'that which comes after'), or are idependent of experience ('a priori', 'that which comes before').

To this class of objects seem to belong corporeal nature in general and its extension; the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude, and their number, as also the place in, and the time during, which they exist, and other things of the same sort. Summary

The doubts Descartes has just expressed about the existence of his body extend to all physical - 'corporeal' or 'extended' - things, their number, size, shape, weight, etc., and also the time and place of their existence.

We will not, therefore, perhaps reason illegitimately if we conclude from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine, and all the other sciences that have for their end the consideration of composite objects, are indeed of a doubtful character; but that Arithmetic, Geometry, and the other sciences of the same class, which regard merely the simplest and most general objects, and scarcely inquire whether or not these are really existent, contain somewhat that is certain and indubitable: for whether I am awake or dreaming, it remains true that two and three make five, and that a square has but four sides; nor does it seem possible that truths so apparent can ever fall under a suspicion of falsity [or incertitude]. Summary

The physical sciences - those which deal with physical reality - come under suspicion because they deal with 'composite' things (involving combinations of ideas of different sorts), and which we may be deceived about through our senses. However, such sciences as Maths and Geometry need not be doubted because they do not rely upon the existence of things outside of themselves to be true, but rather deal with purely intellectual things ('the simplest and most general objects') such as number, shape, etc. As already noted, Descartes is beginning here to distinguish between types of idea based on their involvement with sense experience (and hence how certain they are).

Nevertheless, the belief that there is a God who is all powerful, and who created me, such as I am, has, for a long time, obtained steady possession of my mind. How, then, do I know that he has not arranged that there should be neither earth, nor sky, nor any extended thing, nor figure, nor magnitude, nor place, providing at the same time, however, for [the rise in me of the perceptions of all these objects, and] the persuasion that these do not exist otherwise than as I perceive them? And further, as I sometimes think that others are in error respecting matters of which they believe themselves to possess a perfect knowledge, how do I know that I am not also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgment still more simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined? But perhaps Deity has not been willing that I should be thus deceived, for he is said to be supremely good. If, however, it were repugnant to the goodness of Deity to have created me subject to constant deception, it would seem likewise to be contrary to his goodness to allow me to be occasionally deceived; and yet it is clear that this is permitted. Summary

How do we know that God does not deceive us about the existence of the real world, whilst making us experience the conviction that our perceptions are real? Or even that our simplest truths - such as '2+3=5' - should in fact be false? And although it would seem to be contrary to the goodness of God to allow such deceptions, it is nontheless true that such errors do occasionally happen.

Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful than to believe that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear (since to be deceived and to err is a certain defect ) that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened. To these reasonings I have assuredly nothing to reply, but am constrained at last to avow that there is nothing of all that I formerly believed to be true of which it is impossible to doubt, and that not through thoughtlessness or levity, but from cogent and maturely considered reasons; so that henceforward, if I desire to discover anything certain, I ought not the less carefully to refrain from assenting to those same opinions than to what might be shown to be manifestly false. Summary

The more powerful the thing which created us - whether God or fate - the less likely it is that we are the constant victims of deception, for any imperfection in us (and to be deceived is an imperfection) reflects on the ability of our creator to make us perfect - that is, free from Deception. Whatever the case, the arguments so far have convinced Descartes that everything is open to doubt, and that he should at least withold his assent from his former beliefs.

But it is not sufficient to have made these observations; care must be taken likewise to keep them in remembrance. For those old and customary opinions perpetually recur-- long and familiar usage giving them the right of occupying my mind, even almost against my will, and subduing my belief; nor will I lose the habit of deferring to them and confiding in them so long as I shall consider them to be what in truth they are, viz, opinions to some extent doubtful, as I have already shown, but still highly probable, and such as it is much more reasonable to believe than deny. It is for this reason I am persuaded that I shall not be doing wrong, if, taking an opposite judgment of deliberate design, I become my own deceiver, by supposing, for a time, that all those opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at length, having thus balanced my old by my new prejudices, my judgment shall no longer be turned aside by perverted usage from the path that may conduct to the perception of truth. For I am assured that, meanwhile, there will arise neither peril nor error from this course, and that I cannot for the present yield too much to distrust, since the end I now seek is not action but knowledge. Summary

Whilst taking care to remember his new-found distrust in the physical world, Descartes acknowledges that he still is in the habit of trusting these old opinions which it seems it is 'much more reasonable to believe than deny'. However, he says, he must 'become his own deceiver', and strive to doubt everything that it is possible to doubt, since merely by doing so he cannot at least go wrong.

I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds, and all external things, are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood, or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these; I will continue resolutely fixed in this belief, and if indeed by this means it be not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, viz, [ suspend my judgment ], and guard with settled purpose against giving my assent to what is false, and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever be his power and artifice. But this undertaking is arduous, and a certain indolence insensibly leads me back to my ordinary course of life; and just as the captive, who, perchance, was enjoying in his dreams an imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that it is but a vision, dreads awakening, and conspires with the agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged; so I, of my own accord, fall back into the train of my former beliefs, and fear to arouse myself from my slumber, lest the time of laborious wakefulness that would succeed this quiet rest, in place of bringing any light of day, should prove inadequate to dispel the darkness that will arise from the difficulties that have now been raised. Summary

Perhaps it is not God, who is good, but a 'malignant demon' who may deceive Descartes. Supposing all he thinks of as real is a dream or illusion supplied by this creature, he vows to withhold his judgement from all things which this creature might have power to make him mistaken in relation to. He is tempted, however, like the dreamer of a pleasant dream, to keep on dreaming his imaginary world, fearing that he may awake to find that he cannot dispel the doubts he has raised. Finally, then, this last paragraph of Meditation I finds Descartes in a sombre mood. He has just raised the third and most powerful objection to the possibility of knowledge (the 'malignant demon' argument), and leaves its challenge unanswered. He will continue his search in the next meditation, but for now we get a sense that Descartes really is sitting there in his pyjamas, tired from wrestling with these problems at the end of a long philosophical day (why doesn't he get a proper job? Then he wouldn't be troubled by all these daft worries - well, that's probably what Descartes's mum would say...).

Share this Page

Click on one of the icons below to share this page using any of the listed sharing sites (it inserts the link for you, so you don't need to add it manually). Let me know if any sharing sites you commonly use aren't here, and I will add them.