Philosophy of Mind
Introduction Dualism Behaviourism Identity Theory Functionalism Dennett

Functionalism:

 
 
 
  Multiple Realisability
 
  The Turing Test
 
 
  Zombies and the Chinese Nation
  Summary
  Further Reading


  How is Functionalism different?
 

Functionalism agrees that brain states are responsible for mental states, but disagrees that they are identical with them. To do this, it argues that neurological states or brain activity help to realise mental states, which then lead to behaviour. In this way it solves the main problems with the other two theories by proposing that brain states are "low level" activities that help realise "high level" mental states.

To help understand this idea, consider the usual Functionalist example of a computer. Imagine that you ask a computer to add the numbers 3 and 7. On one level - at a low level - what is happening in the computer is dependent on the hardware; on another level - a high level - the computer's software is calculating the answer. Since, historically, computers have had different hardware that works in different ways, we cannot describe the process of calculation as the activity of hardware. Instead, the Functionalist argues, the process of calculation is simply realised by the hardware. Therefore, the software is a function of the hardware.