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If we translate this talk of computers into talk of the mind, we
can see that the Functionalist views mental states as functional
states of the brain. We may compare the brain with other organs,
such as the eye. The individual parts that make up the eye all serve
the function of seeing. In a similar way, the parts that make up
the brain all serve the function of thinking. Yet, in neither case
- the Functionalist argues - would we want to say that the description
of physical states is sufficient to understand what is going on.
For instance, the parts of the eye allow us to see, but the individual
state of each part is not what we mean by "seeing".
In this way, Functionalism draws
a distinction between a particular state or property being dependent
upon something and something being that thing. So, in terms of the
brain, mental states are dependent upon brain states or neurological
activities in the same way that the functions of a computer program
are dependent upon computer hardware. The way Functionalists speak
about this is to say that brain states help to realise mental states
and that the mind is in fact a total functional system. By this
they mean that a mind is made up of the total possible functional
(mental) states that it can have and that these interact with the
“inputs” and each other in order to produce “outputs”
or behaviour. For instance, take the example of trying something
new to eat (based on example given in Heil, chapter on Functionalism
- see Further Reading):

To
differentiate between this model and behaviourism, this model assumes
that the functional states cause (and are therefore not identical
with) behaviour. This allows both an appearance of choice (“Shall
I respond in this way?”) and the presence of beliefs independent
of any possible behaviour.
The model also
differs from identity theory in that it does not matter what the
physical cause of the mental (or functional) state is. So, whether
my brain state is always the same when I do a particular thing,
or whether it is consistent with other people’s when they
do, is immaterial because there are any number of different ways
in which such an experience might be “realised”.
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