| Philosophy of Mind | |||||
| Introduction | Dualism | Behaviourism | Identity Theory | Functionalism | Dennett |
| Zombies and the Chinese Nation | |
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One criticism of Functionalism concentrates on the idea that according to such a view of the mind it is possible to imagine zombie-like, non-conscious creatures that do not possess “qualia”. Such creatures, whilst fitting the Functionalist criteria for possessing a mind, could not – non-functionalists argue – be said to be human in the full sense (thereby implying that the Functionalist view is inadequate). However, it seems to me that the view pre-supposes the existence of the thing that it is arguing for. In other words, the non-functionalist wants to argue that qualia are necessary in addition to any functionalist explanation in order to account for minds. And yet, if the existence of qualia may be “explained away” in Functionalist terms, then does qualia need to exist anyway? Another possible problem consists in Functionalism’s
definition of what a mind consists of. The philosopher Ned Block
has argued that a case could be made – according to such a
definition – for creating a mind on a grand scale by organising
the whole Chinese nation into a functional entity. Since, according
to Functionalism, all that is needed to define a mind is that certain
functional roles are fulfilled by certain parts, there is no need
for the mind to be made out of anything in particular (as we saw
earlier, Functionalism relies on the idea that Functional states
are “multiply realisable” – an idea which means
that, not only may aliens and animals experience pain, but robots
and the whole Chinese nation as well!). |