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We may throw light on these problems
by distinguishing between the different sorts of identity. For instance,
we may call a certain class of objects – such as cars - a
“type”, whilst a particular car – a Fiat Punto
– may be called a “token”, or representative of
that type.
Now, some forms of Identity Theory
argue that certain types of brain state are identical with certain
types of mental state. So, all sorts of happy mental states would
be identical with certain sorts of brain states. This is known as
Type Identity Theory.
This form of the theory assumes
two things:
-
Everytime you are in a certain mood – such as being happy
– there is the same corresponding brain state
- The
same mood/brain state relationship occurs in everyone else
There are numerous problems with
this view. First of all, can we really say that all my happy moods
have something in common? If I write down the defining characteristics
of all my different moods, won’t I find that some very different
moods have a lot in common (fear and excitement, for instance)?
So, doesn’t this suggest that – even if brain states
are mental states – all happy states might correspond to a
range of very different brain states?
The
next problem concerns how we can be sure that the same mental states
produce the same brain states in other people. Suppose that I am
conducting an experiment to find out exactly what your brain is
doing when you are in a certain mental state. I do this by asking
you to think about certain things or perform certain mental activities.
Every time you do something, I can see parts of your brain become
active, suggesting that that part of the brain is responsible for
doing that thing. Now, suppose I do this experiment for other people
using the same activities and their brain behaves differently. Do
I then assume that they have not carried out the activity properly?
They are mistaken? They are lying. This is commonly known as the
benchmark problem and is responsible for a refinement of the theory
known as Token Identity Theory.
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