Philosophy of Mind
Introduction Dualism Behaviourism Identity Theory Functionalism Dennett

Other Minds :

 
 
 
  Problems
 
  More Problems
 
 
  Summary
  Further Reading


  Problems with this view
 

The obvious problem with this view is that it seems to assume what it is trying to prove – namely, that other people are like me. To illustrate this view, take the possibility that one day there will exist a perfectly human-looking robot. Now, the robot is created using ultra advanced nano technology by a highly developed alien civilisation. As a consequence, there is no way that our human technology could detect the fact that it was a robot. However, it acts like most humans do by responding and acting like a normal human would. However, it isn’t human and doesn’t have a mind.

There is also a subtler objection. Even if we admit that other people possess minds because of the argument from analogy, it does not mean that their mental states are identical with ours, or even that they are similar. Take your understanding of the word “red” and mine. We may both agree that a certain car is red, and so on for any number of red objects. However, the individual experience of what “red” means for me and means for you is arguably beyond our mere agreement. In other words, I may have a totally different mental experience of “redness”.

This problem is linked to the notion of qualia – what it is like to have an experience. I can never have this on behalf of another person. Even if I were telepathic, I would still be experiencing another’s thoughts as myself and not them. So, qualia remain by their very nature incomparable.