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The obvious problem with this view is that it seems to assume what
it is trying to prove – namely, that other people are like
me. To illustrate this view, take the possibility that one day there
will exist a perfectly human-looking robot. Now, the robot is created
using ultra advanced nano technology by a highly developed alien
civilisation. As a consequence, there is no way that our human technology
could detect the fact that it was a robot. However, it acts like
most humans do by responding and acting like a normal human would.
However, it isn’t human and doesn’t have a mind.
There is also a subtler objection. Even if we admit that other
people possess minds because of the argument from analogy, it does
not mean that their mental states are identical with ours, or even
that they are similar. Take your understanding of the word “red”
and mine. We may both agree that a certain car is red, and so on
for any number of red objects. However, the individual experience
of what “red” means for me and means for you is arguably
beyond our mere agreement. In other words, I may have a totally
different mental experience of “redness”.
This problem
is linked to the notion of qualia – what it is like to have
an experience. I can never have this on behalf of another person.
Even if I were telepathic, I would still be experiencing another’s
thoughts as myself and not them. So, qualia remain by their very
nature incomparable.
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