A further account of knowledge and truth is provided by reliabilism. This theory supposes that our main method of justifying our beliefs is to appeal to what has been reliable in the past. Thus, if I want to prove to someone else that I could speak Russian (and not just some string of made-up, Russian-sounding words), we could both go to a native Russian speaker or a lecturer in the languages department at a university who could confirm it. I could also translate some Russian books or attempt to display my knowledge by answering their questions.

These methods would be acceptable to different degrees depending on how reliable they have proven to be. For instance, the fact that I can 'prove' to a large group of people that I can make a coin disappear is not very reliable (a fact that stage magicians exploit).

There are two main methods of reliabilist justification: internal and external. External is obviously the most reliable because it deals with what is apparent to others. So, if I wish to establish some medical fact, I can visit a doctor, who has established scientific ways and means of confirming a diagnosis. Alternatively, I can rely on my own internal sensations to inform me of my own condition (which is obviously not so reliable or open to demonstration).

Problems with Reliabilism

The internalist form of reliabilism seems to be circular. How do we know that the methods we use to establish that something is true are really reliable? What method do I use to check that the means for establishing whether the reliable method is reliable, is itself reliable? And so on.

The externalist form is open to the criticism that just because a method - such as a thermometer - gives us a reliable response, this does not mean that the response is true. So, a computer with a bug in it might always provide the same response to a particular question, but that would not be the correct one.

Discussion

Can you think of any other criticisms of reliabilism? Is it better as a theory of truth than the others already discussed? Are there any counter arguments that a reliabilist could use?